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Freedom of Expression, the Right to Vote, and Proportionality  




This article offers an internal critique of the European Court of Human Rights’ deferential approach to 
the content and limits of the right to vote (under the right to free and fair elections, Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 ECHR). Rather than imposing an independent theory of democratic rights, the critique is 
internal as it relies on the Court’s own conception of democracy developed under Article 10 ECHR 
(freedom of expression) and Article 11 ECHR (freedom of reunion and assembly). It uses normative 
democratic theory to show that the Court’s conception under those rights reveals an utmost concern 
for political inclusion and that this conception is systematically used by the Court to balance alleged 
interferences with this article It then argues that this concern has implications for the Court’s review of 
the right to vote. While the Court proclaims the complementarity between expression and vote at the 
level of principle, the Court refrains from engaging in the balancing exercise under P1-3. The article 
takes the notorious example of the right of convicted felons to vote. The article does not conclude, 
however, that the Court should systematically maintain their franchise on democratic grounds. It rather 
contends that the Court should apply proportionality with the same substantive democratic principles 
across democratic rights. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since its early days, the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, the Court) has 
incessantly insisted on the place of freedom of expression in what the Court calls a ‘democratic 
society’. The Court proclaims that a democratic society ‘thrives on freedom of expression’.1 This 
insistence can be measured by different and complementary patterns in the case law: a wide content 
and scope assigned to the right, a teleological or purposive approach to interpretation and, as a result, a 
thin margin of appreciation left to the respondent state party. The reasons for this insistence do not 
only relate to individual autonomy and flourishing. Rather, the Court emphasizes that (a wide) 
freedom of expression is crucial to realize and preserve a ‘democratic society’ conceived as a model of 
collective organization and decision-making processes.   
In the Court’s eyes, ‘democratic society’ extends far beyond a formal model of democracy limited to a 
procedure of majority voting. The role of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereafter, the Convention) specifically applies to the informal and deliberative stage of the 
democratic process. Allowing a person to express her views in the public debate – even the 
‘unpalatable’2 and ‘divisive’3 ones – contributes to the person’s inclusion in the democratic process. 
This explains, for instance, why the Court applies this approach only to views and opinions that 
concern issues of public interest, as we shall see. This also explains why the Court extends a wide 
protection of expression to a range of social actors whose common role is to inform individuals about 
issues of public interest, such as the press, political parties, scientists and intellectuals, or NGOs, as I 
shall illustrate.  
This deliberative stage precedes the formal stage of voting and/or election protected in Convention 
through Article 3 Protocol 1 (P1-3). As we shall see, the Court clearly conceives those two articles as 
                                                          
1 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, at para. 49. 
2 Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey, App. Nos. 25067/94, 25068/94, 8 July 1999, at para. 42. 
3 Lingens v. Austria, App. No 9815/82, 8 July 1986, at para. 41. 
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interdependent to realize and preserve its ‘democratic society’. However, when it comes to the content 
and limits of Article P1-3 (formally, the right to free elections), the Court’s level of scrutiny remains 
surprisingly limited – in stark contrast to Article 10. This becomes clear when one compares how the 
Court applies the proportionality test to each of those provisions. The principled role of proportionality 
is to establish the conditions for a legitimate interference with Convention rights. Under Article 10, the 
Court balances the aim of these interferences against its substantive notion of ‘democratic society’. 
Under P1-3, in contrast, the Court’s application of the test is limited to examining whether the measure 
taken by the state party was rationally connected to the aim pursued and whether it was strictly 
necessary. But the normative basis of the measure itself – and its compatibility with the Court’s 
‘democratic society’ – is not assessed in substantive terms.  
This is the case of the ban on the prisoners’ right to vote: the Court fails to balance the principle of 
civic disenfranchisement (justifying the ban) against its rich notion of ‘democratic society’. The 
specialized literature – in particular, on the “saga” of the prisoners’ voting rights in the UK4 – has 
noted the Court’s particular and limited application of the proportionality test to P1-3, as we shall see 
in more details. To reinforce this form of deference, the Court may also refer to the consensus 
prevailing across the Council of Europe (hereafter, the CoE) – whose lack usually justifies allocating a 
wide margin of appreciation to the respondent state party. This form of deference exemplifies, 
following the Letsas, the ‘structural’ use of the margin of appreciation where the Court refrains from 
engaging in balancing between the right and the competing public or state interest.5  
It is rather easy to illustrate how the Court expands on the need for a vibrant democracy through a rich 
and contradictory public debate on the one hand (Article 10, but also Article 11 (freedom of reunion 
and assembly), and a more restrictive approach to the right to vote (Article P1-3) on the other. The 
literature on P1-3 has specifically noted the Court’s obscure definition of the legitimate aims that can 
justify an interference with the right to vote. As we shall see, Ziegler in particular urges the Court to 
adopt ‘a more rigorous approach for scrutinizing legislative measure regulating access to the 
democratic process’6 and precisely points to the Court’s acceptance of “poorly defined policy aims”.7  
To further develop the distinction between expression and vote, one can also distinguish the different 
interpretive methods the Court adopts: its activism on Article 10 reflects a teleological approach to 
judicial interpretation – understood as a vibrant ‘democratic society’ – while the restraint with regard 
to P1-3 reflects a consensualist approach connecting the content of the rights to the evolving 
consensus found across the CoE. What is missing, in my view, is a systematic normative evaluation of 
the Court’s differential approach between expression and vote. One could surely point to a lack of 
coherence between the two methods of judicial reasoning underlying the reasoning. But restricting the 
analysis to identifying judicial methodology is incomplete. This is because the choice of interpretive 
method is itself normative. If expression and vote interdepend at the level of principle, as the Court 
makes abundantly clear, it is not clear why the method of adjudication should vary to such an extent. 
Therefore, I suggest that one cannot bring the debate forward without adopting a properly normative 
                                                          
4 See in particular Ed Bates, “Analysing the Prisoner Voting Saga and the British Challenge to Strasbourg,” 
Human Rights Law Review 14, no. 3 (2014): 503–40. 
5 George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation,’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26, no. 4 
(2006): 705–32. 
6 Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, “Voting Eligibility: Strasbourg’s Timidity” in Katja S. Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks, and 
Loveday Hodson, The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2015), at 166. 
7 Ibid., at 173. 
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standpoint – one that both reconstructs the Court’s reasoning and methodology and critically evaluates 
the Court’s differential treatment from within.  
This being said, the normative assessment should not only apply to one side of the equation, namely 
the Court’s restraint with regard to the right to vote. The mere principle of political equality is also 
insufficient to explain the Court’s expansive approach to freedom of expression: in what sense does 
allowing ‘unpalatable’ or ‘divisive’ views to ‘find a place in the public arena’8 enhance political 
equality? Extending freedom of expression inevitably implies restricting the state’s pursuit of a public 
good that may also be defined in terms of (cumulated) individual rights. As a result, a fine-grained 
analysis is also needed on the normative side to clarify and assess the Court’s purposive approach to 
Article 10.  
To tackle those questions, this article is four-pronged. First, I critically survey the Court’s approach to 
Articles 10 and 11 and reconstruct the Court’s grounds for extending their content and scope. I 
emphasize the teleological reasoning adopted by the Court, which leads the Court to weigh 
interferences against its ‘democratic society’ in the proportionality test. More precisely, I illustrate the 
extent to which the Court’s self-defined telos resists competing considerations. Second, I critically 
examine the Court’s approach to Article P1-3 and explain the Court’s grounds for limiting its content 
and scope. Here again, I reconstruct the Court’s proportionality test and contrast it with Article 10. I 
show that despite firmly proclaiming their interdependence at the level of principle, the Court fails to 
balance interferences with the Court’s telos. Third, I problematize the Court’s differential approach by 
means of normative democratic theory. I show that the Court’s expansive approach to Article 10 
reflects a deep concern for equal inclusion in the democratic process. I then argue that this concern 
should apply to the right to vote of convicted prisoners. To illustrate this point, I examine the various 
judgments pertaining to the limitation of the prisoners’ voting rights, and show how the Court should 
substantively engage with the arguments offered by state parties in favor of the ban. I do not conclude, 
however, that the Court should necessarily protected the right to vote to all convicted felons based on 
democratic reasons. Rather, my point is methodological: I hold that there is enough in the Court’s telos 
of ‘democratic society’ to at least engage with the democratic credentials of such bans and weigh these 
credentials against arguments supporting the ban, thereby increasing coherence across the range of the 
concerned rights. 
As a result, my argument does not question the Court’s general approach to judicial deference 
(through the margin of appreciation). Unlike other accounts that generally view human rights 
adjudication as seeking moral truths 9 , I reconstruct the Court’s own conceptual and normative 
framework and place my coherence concerns within it. Similarly, at the level of normative theory, my 
critique does not only rely on the abstract continuum between Article 10 and Article P1-3. Rather, I 
build on the Court’s own appeal to democratic considerations. The role of normative political theory is 
therefore not to assess the Court’s practice from a privileged and independent normative standpoint 
(the ‘philosopher king’ position), but both to carefully reconstruct the Court’s interpretive approach 
and to critically appraise it from within – in order to enhance the value of critique. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Piermont v. France, App. Nos. 15773/89, 15774/89, 24 July 1995, para. 76. 
9 See in particular George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer,’ The 
European Journal of International Law 21, no. 3 (2010): 509–41. 
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2. Articles 10 and 11 
2.1. Grounds, content and scope 
The objective of this first section is not to offer a descriptive overview of the Court’s case law 
on freedom of expression (Article 10), which can be found in numerous textbooks. Rather, I aim to 
identify the type of reasoning that the Court develops when it interprets and balances Article 10 
against competing considerations in the proportionality test. As explained in the introduction, despite 
the proclaimed complementary roles of Article 10 and Article P3-1 in principle, the Court uses 
different tools of interpretation in practice. What justifies the Court adopting a purposive approach to 
Article 10? I start by focusing on the notion of  ‘democratic society’ and the crucial role it plays in the 
proportionality test.  
In principle, the proportionality test examines the conditions for interfering with a protected right. As 
far as Article 10 is concerned, the Convention stipulates that these conditions should be determined in 
light of what is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This corresponds to the last, balancing phase of 
the proportionality test as conventionally construed. After having assessed the legality and necessity 
requirements of the state party’s measure, the Court properly weighs the measure against what is 
‘necessary in a democratic society’. This step is conventionally called proportionality stricto sensu. As 
Barak explains in the constitutional context, proportionality stricto sensu ‘requires a balancing of the 
benefits gained by the public and the harm caused to the constitutional right through the use of the 
means selected by law to obtain the proper purpose’.10 On this conventional view, an interference with 
an individual right has to be weighed against the pursuit of a collective good or policy objective (what 
is ‘necessary in a democratic society’).  
However, in the practice of the Court the notion of ‘democratic society’ has expanded from this 
original function of potentially overriding the right in question to a normative function of justifying the 
purpose of the right and delimiting its content.11 As the Court held in the seminal Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, freedom of expression  
‘is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic 
society”’ (my emphasis).12 
This clearly illustrates the normative role of ‘democratic society’ and the instrumental role of freedom 
of expression. This also demarcates the Court’s approach from purely liberal approaches to freedom of 
expression. Indeed, one could argue that the right simply ought to be protected to the greatest possible 
extent for all, for instance. Instead, the Court suggests that the interest protected by the right is 
collective and uses ‘democratic society’ to convey this point. Alternatively, the Court could examine 
whether this or that ‘offensive, shocking or disturbing’ view is accepted or acceptable within the state 
party (or across the Council of Europe) and then induce the corresponding level of protection. Instead, 
the Court’s link between expression and democracy is inherent. This link thereby suggests that 
                                                          
10 Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights And Their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 340. 
11 On this specific point, see Alain Zysset, ‘Searching for the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human 
Rights: The Neglected Role of ‘Democratic Society,’’ Global Constitutionalism 5, no. 1 (2016): 16–47. 
12 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, supra note 1, at para. 49. 
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‘democratic society’ matters in a moral, independent sense, and that this notion should fix the limits of 
the right’s content.  
What, then, does ‘democratic society’ precisely consist of? I understand the Court’s normative ideal as 
an informed, plural and contradictory debate on issues of public interest. 13  First and foremost, 
pluralism is a necessary component of the Court’s ‘democratic society’. Pluralism therefore justifies 
why ‘offensive’, ‘shocking’ or ‘disturbing’ views should fall within the scope of the right.  
‘[A]s the Court has said many times, there can be no democracy without pluralism. It is 
for that reason that freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 is applicable, subject 
to paragraph 2, not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock 
or disturb’.14 
 
One implication of the Court’s attachment to pluralism is that not only individuals but also collective 
entities can contribute to it. This is clearly the case of political parties, for instance. It is well 
established that:  
‘such expression is inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of political 
parties representing the different shades of opinion to be found within a country’s 
population. By relaying this range of opinion, not only within political institutions but 
also - with the help of the media - at all levels of social life, political parties make an 
irreplaceable contribution to political debate, which is at the very core of the concept of a 
democratic society’.15 
 
Another implication is that the Court’s review of freedom of reunion and assembly (Article 11) should 
be subsumed under the review Article 10. The Court explicitly emphasizes their interdependence:  
 
‘The Court reiterates that notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of 
application, Article 11 must also be considered in the light of Article 10. The protection 
of opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of 
assembly and association as enshrined in Article 11. That applies all the more in relation 
to political parties in view of their essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper 
functioning of democracy”.16 
As a result, the Court may subsume its review of Article 11 under its review of Article 10 although the 
two rights need in principle to be examined separately. In this respect, the recent case law of the Court 
points to an extension of a class of actors that nurture public debate, in particular to NGOs. As 
Mowbray rightly points out, ‘an expanding range of organizations and bodies play important roles in 
formulating and disseminating ideas and information on topics of public debate in democratic 
societies’.17 Mowbray further explains that the Court then scrutinizes the extent to which ‘the purpose 
of the applicant’s activities can therefore be said to have been an essential element of informed public 
                                                          
13 I defend this argument in chapters 8 and 9 in Alain Zysset, The ECHR and Human Rights Theory: Reconciling 
the Moral and the Political Conceptions (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 
14 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, App. No.13392/92, 30 January 1998, at para. 43. 
15 Ibid., at para. 44. 
16 Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 29221/95, 29225/95, 2 
October 2001, at para. 27. 
17 Alastair Mowbray, ‘Contemporary Aspects of the Promotion of Democracy by the European Court of Human 
Rights,’ European Public Law 20, no. 3, 2014, at 472. 
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debate. The Court has repeatedly recognized civil society’s important contribution to the discussion of 
public affairs’.18 
Those passages illustrate not only that a diversity of social and political actors can contribute to the 
core of a democratic society, but also that pluralism should prevail within each class of actors in order 
to fully meet the Court’s criteria. As Neuwinis puts it, ‘the concept (of pluralism) both aims at an 
existing feature of certain societies and at an idea that is to be fostered’.19 More precisely, pluralism 
does not only bring diversity, but also contradiction in the public debate – to the point that the Court 
has explicitly recognized the right of the wider public to receive contradictory views. In Erdoğdu and 
İnce v. Turkey, for instance, the Court found a violation of Article 10 on the ground that the interview 
of a sociologist pertaining to the analysis of the political situation in south-east Turkey cannot be 
conceived as exacerbating the Kurdish nationalist sentiment in the region: 
 
‘domestic authorities in the instant case failed to have sufficient regard to the public’s right 
to be informed of a different perspective on the situation in south-east Turkey, irrespective 
of how unpalatable that perspective may be for them’.20 
Yet, while a variety of social actors can play a similar function, none of them ranks higher than the 
press in the preservation of a democratic society. Since its early days, the Court has relentlessly 
insisted on its role of ‘public watchdog of a democratic society’. The press therefore epitomizes the 
Court’s substantive notion of ‘democratic society’ as enabling a vibrant and contradictory public 
debate: 
 
‘it is nevertheless incumbent on the press to convey information and ideas on political 
issues, even divisive ones. Not only has the press the task of imparting such information 
and ideas; the public has a right to receive them. Freedom of the press affords the public 
one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of 
political leaders’.21 
Logically, the margin of appreciation in this domain is reduced and the Court makes this very clear. In 
Editions Plon v. France, it held that ‘the national margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the 
interests of a democratic society in enabling the press to exercise its vital role of “public watchdog’”.22 
As I further explain in section 4 of this article, the central role of the press is explained by its double 
function at the deliberative stage of the democratic process. Not only does the press operate as a public 
forum for exchanging views and opinions, but it also provides crucial information for individuals to 
form those views and opinions in the first place. One can conclude from this incursion that the Court 
has developed a substantive conception of democracy built into the notion of ‘democratic society’ 
initially located at the last stage of the proportionality test.  
 
2.2. The prevailing type of judicial reasoning 
Having illustrated the Court’s predominant reasoning on Article 10 and its normative 
assumptions, I now leave aside the various cases and reconstruct the Court’s approach in more abstract 
and theoretical terms. In a textbook on judicial methodology, the Court’s reasoning on Article 10 
                                                          
18 Ibid, at 472. 
19 Aernout Nieuwenhuis, ‘The Concept of Pluralism in the Case Law of the ECtHR,’ European Constitutional 
Law Review 3, no. 3 (2007), at 368. 
20 Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey, supra note 2, at para.51. 
21 Özgür Gündem v Turkey, App No. 23144/93, 16 March 2000, at para. 52. 
22 Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00, 18 May 2004, at para. 43. 
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clearly appears as teleological. Rather than strictly relying on the text of the Convention, the intention 
of the drafters or the predominant practice in state parties (or in the respondent state party), the Court’s 
reasoning is driven by a more encompassing normative value that the Court reads into the Convention. 
In the words of Jacobs, the teleological approach corresponds to ‘a broader inquiry into the objects and 
purposes of the treaty taken as a whole, and individual provisions of the treaty are construed so as to 
give effect to these objects and purposes’.23 The telos of the Convention is here understood as an 
effective democratic process tied to its core constitutive component, namely an informed, plural and 
contradictory public debate; and Article 10 and 11 as the provisions that can best serve to realize this 
telos. 
 
The teleological doctrine originates in the central source for the interpretation of international treaties, 
namely the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereafter, the VCLT), and in particular 
in its Article 31(1). This article stipulates that ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and light of its object 
and purpose’. However, how exactly judges should order the triad of ordinary meaning, context, and 
purpose is still a matter of debate. Initially, the predominant view is that the purpose should be opted 
for as a measure of last resort. Citing the International Law Commission Commentaries on the draft of 
the VLCT, Cali explains that ‘since 1969, there has been wider support for a holistic approach to 
Article 31. This approach emphasizes the importance of an interpreter’s judgment as to how the 
wording, context, and object and purpose interact with each other’.24  
In the specific context of the Court, it appears that the reference to context has grounded the doctrines 
of ‘evolutive’ and ‘dynamic’ interpretation25, which are closely connected to the observation of a 
changing practice among state parties and the presence of a consensus. In contrast, the reference to 
purpose grounds the teleological method and that method seems to prevail under Articles 10-11. It 
must also be kept in mind, however, that generally speaking the Court rarely refers to the VCLT 
explicitly and does not widely appeal to other treaties or general principles of international law. Letsas 
for instance notes that the VCLT ‘has been cited no more than sixty out of the more than then 
thousand judgments which the ECtHR has delivered’.26 Forowicz further explains that ‘generally, they 
prefer to remain within the confines of the ECHR, which were clearly mandated by the contracting 
states (…). This shows a lack of any initiative on the part of the Court or Commission to refer to 
international law’.27 
As a result, if ‘human rights treaties do not require exceptional rules of interpretation that are 
hermeneutically sealed off from the VLCT regime’28, it remains to be seen how these rules exactly 
operate in practice. This is where one can question how the Court reads the telos into the Convention. 
Of course, one may find traces of the importance of public debate in the Preamble to the Convention 
or the preparatory works. Yet, the simple fact of tracing the teleological approach back to the VLCT is 
                                                          
23 Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference,’ International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1969), at 319.  
24 Basak Çali, ‘Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights’, in Duncan B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford 
Guide to Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 598. 
25 See in particular George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy,’ in Andreas 
Follesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in 
National, European and International Context (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
26 See Letsas, supra note 6, footnote 10. 
27 Magdalena Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), at 368-369. 
28 See Çali, supra note 20, at 537. 
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not sufficient to determine what the telos of a human rights convention exactly consists of. While such 
choice can exclude alternative approaches to interpretation, it does not by itself define the telos 
appropriate to a particular convention or treaty. As Letsas puts it, ‘individuating the object and 
purpose of the treaty is by no means a mechanical exercise; it is itself an interpretive question’.29 
Given the indeterminate and abstract wording of the Convention, one cannot assume that the telos 
assigned to Articles 10 and 11, namely the imperative of an informed, plural and contradictor public 
debate, can be deduced from a single legal source. The telos explains that the Court’s reasoning 
becomes deductive; the reasoning flows from the telos to the right and its correlative duties without 
being altered by competing or qualifying elements. This does not mean that the Court ignores the 
balancing phase of the proportionality test, but precisely that the telos is sufficiently strong to override 
competing considerations.  
To develop this point further, I want to illustrate the kind of competing consideration against which 
the Court needs to balance its ‘democratic society’ in the proportionality test. Typically, a competing 
consideration may be another right protected by the Convention that conflicts with Article 10, such as 
the right to reputation under Article 8. In this respect, the weight of Article 10 may be less heavy if the 
view or opinion expressed does not pertain to an issue of public interest. Alternatively, as we shall see 
in more detail later, the absence of uniform practice across the Council of Europe with regard to that 
particular duty may also lead the Court to trigger the margin of appreciation. Similarly, the Court may 
be receptive to how sensitive a particular view or opinion within the respondent state party. Yet, those 
considerations do not matter when the issue pertains to the public debate and its place in a ‘democratic 
society’: 
‘In the Court’s view, a legal system which applies restrictions on human rights in order to 
satisfy the dictates of public feeling – real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting 
the pressing social needs recognised in a democratic society, since that society must 
remain reasonable in its judgment’.30 
 
It is important to pause here and note that the ‘dictates of public feeling’ instantiate a notion of 
sociological legitimacy: it is the fact that some opinion or view is perceived as offensive as a matter of 
empirics by a majority of individuals within the respondent state party. As I shall explain later, it has 
been argued that the Court does not bring evidence of the acceptance of some opinion, view or symbol, 
when it relies on this alleged evidence to further extend or restrict an article of the Convention. This 
issue goes beyond the context of the Court. Helfer for instance argues that ‘the tribunals have yet to 
clarify the relative weight that they should be given in determining the presence of absence of an 
evolving European viewpoint’. 31  Let us also notice that beyond numerical considerations, the 
historical meaning of the viewpoint may also count. In the case of freedom of expression, the 
resistance towards displaying political symbols in public – such as the five-pointed communist red star 
in Vajnai v. Hungary – is a good example. These symbols may carry a particularly traumatic history in 
some state parties that also may contradict the very principles and values pursued by the Court’s 
‘democratic society’. Allowing those symbols in public might benefit a small number of persons while 
implying high costs for many. Yet, the Court dismisses any consideration for the losing side of the 
equation and grounds this refusal in the need for a contradictory public debate in a ‘democratic 
                                                          
29 See Letsas, supra note 8, at 33. 
30 Vajnai v Hungary, App. No. 33629/06, 8 July 2008, at para. 57. 
31 Lawrence Helfer, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 




society’. The balancing is therefore conducted with a clear ‘preferential framing’ 32 in favor of Article 
10. 
To conclude, this incursion into the case law and its abstract reconstruction leaves us with two 
questions: if legal sources fall short of explaining precisely how the Court understands ‘democratic 
society’ as the telos of the Convention, can democratic theory provide insights to make sense of the 
Court’s generous approach to Articles 10-11? And how does the Court address other rights that 
complement the Court’s attachment to the democratic process, such as the right to free elections? I 
start the next section with the latter question before addressing theoretical considerations in the 
following section. 
3. Article P1 – 3 
3.1. Grounds, content, scope 
Let us then turn to the right to free and fair elections (Protocol 1 Article 3) and its 
jurisprudential developments. The complementarity between expression and elections is intuitively 
clear at the level of normative theory: while Article 10 and 11 protect the informal conditions of the 
democratic process, the right to free elections (P1-3) protects the formal conditions for all subjects to 
have an equal say on matters of public interest (the right to vote) and an equal opportunity to run for 
office (the right to stand for elections). Here again, I first survey the content adduced to this right when 
the Court interprets P1-3 before reconstructing how the Court applies the proportionality test. More 
precisely, I show that despite the Court’s claim that Article 10 and P1-3 complement each other in 
fundamental ways, the Court limits proportionality analysis to the necessity step of the test and fails to 
weigh the purpose of the measure taken by the state party against its substantive notion of ‘democratic 
society’.  
Let us begin with the basic purpose of P1-3 as assigned by the Court. Given its necessary place in any 
basic model of a formal democracy, the Court has for long identified this purpose as the ‘free 
expression of the will of the people in a democratic society’. The Court has also specified the 
indispensable practical conditions for this formal process to take place, namely that they should be free 
(that is, under secret ballot) and held at ‘reasonable intervals’. All those elements, which have become 
constant in the case law, are found in a single proposition for instance in Labita v. Italy. 
 ‘“free” elections at “reasonable intervals” “by secret ballot” and “under conditions which 
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people”, are the subjective rights to 
vote and to stand for election’. 33 
In addition, the Court has also largely emphasized the interdependence between freedom of expression 
and the right to free elections in forming the foundations of a ‘democratic society’, thereby pointing to 
a consonance of purpose – in particular, when the Court explicitly refers to the telos of political debate 
discussed above:  
‘free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political debate, 
together form the bedrock of any democratic system (…). The two rights are inter-related 
and operate to reinforce each other: for example, as the Court has observed in the past, 
                                                          
32 On this notion, see in particular Smet Stijn, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human 
Rights in Conflict,’ American University International law Review 26, no. 1 (2010): 183-236. 
33 Labita v. Italy, App. No. 26772/95, 6 April 2000, at para. 201. 
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freedom of expression is one of the “conditions” necessary to ensure the free expression 
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’.34 
 
But defining the basic purpose of the right and establishing its location within a broader set of rights is 
one thing. Defining its content and scope is another. When the Court moves from the purpose of the 
right to its correlative obligations, one can notice some peculiarities. For instance, while the article 
does not form part of the qualified rights of the Convention with similar restriction clauses, the Court 
has held that P1-3 is not absolute and has in fact applied the same proportionality test as to the rest of 
the qualified rights. More importantly, the Court has explained that, contrary to the other rights of the 
Convention, the right to free elections entails significant positive obligations:  
‘Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 differs from other rights guaranteed by the Convention and 
its Protocols as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of the High Contracting Party to 
hold elections which ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in 
terms of a particular right or freedom’.35 
What the Court underlies here is that a state party cannot fulfil the basic obligations corresponding to 
the right to free elections only by allowing individuals to do or not to do something. The level of 
positive obligations on the part of public authorities is therefore higher – not to meet some higher 
threshold defined by the Court, but to fulfil the necessary conditions for making the right effective. 
This already indicates that ‘the Court’s approach reveals a certain caution or prudence in imposing a 
Strasbourg view of how the national constitutional order should function in place of that chosen by the 
“people” through national institutions’.36 
 
When it comes to correlative obligations, the Court has firmly distinguished the right to vote, on the 
one hand, from the right to stand for elections, on the other. With regard to the latter, ‘the Court, like 
the Commission, considers that this Article guarantees the individual’s right to stand for election and, 
once elected, to sit as a member of parliament’.37 The obligation to exercise one’s elected mandate is 
particularly important in this respect. For instance, the Court went on to rely on a principle of 
legitimate expectation, according to which the elected parliamentarian should serve the mandate given 
to him by the constituents. In Lykourezos v. Greece, which pertained to the disqualification of a Greek 
parliamentarian for exercising another profession, the Court held that: ‘the Special Supreme Court had 
caused him to forfeit his seat and had deprived his constituents of the candidate whom they had chosen 
freely and democratically to represent them for four years in Parliament, in breach of the principle of 
legitimate expectation’.38 
In contrast, the Court’s restraint increases significantly when it comes to the obligations of the right to 
vote. The denial of the right to vote based on a person’s criminal conviction is an illustrative example. 
Irrespective of whether the Court finds a violation of P1-3 (it did in Hirst v. United Kingdom, while it 
did not in Scoppola v. Italy, as we shall see in detail later), the type of reasoning widely differs from 
Articles 10-11 despite their alleged complementarity. Indeed, one might expect the Court to balance 
the justification for banning prisoners against the Court’s ‘democratic society’, since the right to vote 
and freedom of expression form a continuum in the Court’s own view. Yet, the Court has not engaged 
                                                          
34 Bowman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24839/94, 19 February 1998, at para. 18 and para. 22. 
35 Zdanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, 16 March 2006, at para. 102. 
36 Michael O’Boyle, ‘Electoral Disputes and the ECHR: An Overview’, available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-UD(2008)010rev-e, at 2. 
37 Sadak and Others v. Turkey (No.2), App. Nos. 25144/94, 26149/95, 26150/95, 26151/95, 26152/95, 26153/95, 
26154/95, 27100/95, 27101/95, 11 June 2002, at para. 33. 
38 Lykourezos v. Greece, App. No. 33554/03, 15 June 2006, at para .57. 
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in such an exercise when examining the content and limits of P1-3. It is correct that the Court usually 
starts by purposive considerations when it explains that the conditions for restricting the right should 
‘not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of 
their effectiveness’ when their essence is understood by the Court as ‘the free expression of the people 
in the choice of the legislature’.39 However, the decisive element of the Court’s reasoning hardly 
appeals to teleology. What matters to the Court is whether the measure taken by the state is rationally 
connected and strictly necessary to serve the aim pursued (the second step of the test conventionally 
construed). In the words of Barak, necessity ‘examines the question of whether alternative means can 
fulfil the law’s purpose at the level of intensity and efficiency as the means determined by the limiting 
law’.40 This is most famously the case in Hirst v. United Kingdom (no.2) where the Court found that 
the United Kingdom’s measure – depriving all convicted felons from voting rights – was 
indiscriminate and therefore excessive: 
‘such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important 
Convention right must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, 
however wide that margin might be, and as being incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1’.41  
It must be clear, however, that holding a particular law or policy to be disproportionate does not entail 
questioning its underlying purpose. In fact, the stage of purpose was passed earlier in the Court’s 
review when it examined whether the law or policy pursued a legitimate aim (in this case, ‘preventing 
crime and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law’).  
Therefore, the Court does not discuss the purpose of disenfranchisement and its compatibility with its 
sacro-sanct ‘democratic society’ in normative terms. The same type of reasoning is found in Scoppola 
v. Italy (No.3) although this time the measure taken by the respondent state party is deemed 
proportionate: ‘in the circumstances the Court cannot conclude that the Italian system has the general, 
automatic and indiscriminate character that led it, in the Hirst (no. 2) case, to find a violation of 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1’.42  The point has been well noted in the literature, most clearly by Ziegler: 
“without further analysis, the judgment proceeded on the assumption that the Hirst judgment (No. 2) 
are legitimate and applicable, here, too”.43 He also rightly mentions that the Court invokes democracy 
to ground the Italian’s aim of “ensuring the proper functioning and preservation of the democratic 
regime”. 44  This reveals the Court’s attachment to formal democracy, and hence seems to 
uncomfortably fit the Court’s substantive approach to Articles 10-11.  
Before developing this critique, it is crucial to see that the Court refers to the consensus among state 
parties to adjust its level of scrutiny. It is a regular statement of the Court that P1-3 is not absolute and 
state parties may enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. But the consensualist approach also intervenes 
in the proportionality test, specifically as in Scoppola:  
‘since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, 
the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State and 
                                                          
39 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, App. No. 9267/81, 2 March 1998, at para. 22 
40 Barak, supra note no. 7, at 321. 
41 Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 6 October 2005, at para. 82. 
42 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, 22 May 2012, at para. 82. 
43 Ziegler, “Voting Eligibility,” 166. 
44 Ibid., para 92. 
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within Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to any evolving 
convergence as to the standards to be achieved’.45 
In that respect, the Court observed that: 
‘Only nineteen of the States examined impose no restrictions on the voting rights of 
convicted prisoners. Of the remaining twenty-four States, which do apply restrictions to 
varying degrees, eleven require a decision of the criminal court on a case-by-case basis 
(with some exceptions where the most serious sentences are concerned – as in Greece and 
Luxembourg)’.46 
 
Then, the Court reiterated its principled approach:  
 
‘This information underlines the importance of the principle that each State is free to 
adopt legislation in the matter in accordance with ‘historical development, cultural 
diversity and political thought within Europe, which it is for each Contracting State to 
mould into their own democratic vision’.47 
 
3.2. The prevailing type of judicial reasoning 
It is crucial to clearly disentangle the two types of reasoning that operate in the Court’s 
assessment of P1-3 on the issue of prisoners’ rights. Most importantly, it appears that the Court does 
not question the very principle of civic disenfranchisement that usually justifies the banning of 
prisoners from the voting process. This is the overarching question on which the Court adopts a 
consensualist approach of interpretation, whose guiding principle is to screen the legislation and 
associated practices of state parties across the Council of Europe. This method is not necessarily 
conservative; finding consensus on a particular issue allows the Court to interpret the Convention in a 
‘dynamic and evolutive’ fashion – thereby echoing the VLCT’s reference to ‘context’ – and thereby 
justifies extending the content and scope of rights.  
 
A number of concerns have been raised with regard to consensualism in the literature. Given 
consensus’s anchor in the idea of unanimity, concerns have been raised that ‘trend’ better describes 
what the Court is tracking. Concerns have also been raised about the object of consensus, namely 
whether it concerns principles or whether it extends to rules. Finally, the scope of consensus has also 
been questioned.48 Dzetshiarou argues that ‘the best practice of the Court is when European consensus 
is based on comprehensive and transparent analysis of the Contracting Parties’ legislation’.49 There is 
more agreement on the structural implications of consensus observation, namely that generally ‘a lack 
of consensus established a presumption in favour of diversity and justifies a broader margin of 
appreciation’.50 This last point is of particular relevance to the Court’s approach to P1-3, as we have 
seen. It corresponds to what Letsas has called the ‘structural’ use of the margin of appreciation, in 
which the margin ‘has to do with the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and 
                                                          
45 Ibid., at para. 94 
46 Ibid., at para. 101. 
47 Ibid., at para. 102. 
48 Jeffrey A. Brauch, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law,’ Columbia Journal of European Law 11, no. 113 (2005), at 145.  
49 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 27. 
50 Ibid., at 37. 
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national authorities, rather than with the relationship between human rights and public interest’.51 In 
addition to those concerns, my inquiry into the Court’s reasoning under Article 10-11 further 
reinforces the scepticism towards the role of consensualism. Indeed, if the doctrine were to be 
conferred any consistency, then one may seriously wonder why the doctrine is almost never used 
under Articles 10–11.  
 
This being said, we have also noted that this prima facie judicial restraint with regard to the very 
purpose of the interference (civic disenfranchisement) does not prevent the Court from applying the 
proportionality test albeit limited to the necessity step of the test. Bates notes that “arguably the 
reference to proportionality suggested that the specific conduct (“crime committed”) had to match the 
‘sanction’ (disenfranchisement) for the individual prisoner concerned, the intervention of a judge 
being best suited for that”.52 In this restricted test, the Court’s reasoning is more substantive when it 
comes to the rules of proportionality of the respondent state party’s practice of disenfranchisement – 
that is, whether the sentence is indiscriminate or applied ad hoc by a judge. With respect to Scoppola 
specifically, Lang for instance compares the Court’s reasoning with the Canadian Supreme Court and 
suggests that ‘the Court should adopt a proportionality analysis similar to the analysis in Sauvé v. 
Canada (No. 2), which requires a rational relationship between the legitimate aim and the measure 
intended to further it’.53 Therefore, the consensualist approach replaces the teleological approach on 
the question of the legitimate aim. The proportionality test takes places between the state party’s 
legitimate aim and the measure adopted, without the legitimate aim being balanced against the Court’s 
wider idea of ‘democratic society’ that plays such an important role under Articles 10-11, as we have 
seen. This is precisely where the dis-analogy appears. This lack of specification of the aim pursued has 
been well captured in the literature on P1-3.  
 
This reconstruction shows that the choice of interpretive method follows from (explicit or implicit) 
premises about the normative significance the Convention’s rights. One can conclude that P1-3 does 
not seem to form part of the telos of the Convention. As a result, state parties enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation beyond the core obligation of ensuring the expression of the will of the people. The rest 
‘is for each Contracting State to mould into their own democratic vision’, as the Court repeatedly 
holds. Only with this premise in mind can one explain why the Court simply relies on the incremental 
development of a consensus across the members of the Council of Europe when it reviews issues such 
as the prisoners’ right to vote. Only then can one explain why the Court’s review is limited to whether 
the measure was disproportionate or not. Yet, the Court does not clearly support this premise on clear 
and principled grounds. More importantly for our purposes, this restraint sharply contrasts with the 
teleological method used under Articles 10 and 11. Here, the Court balances the alleged interference 
against its substantive notion of a ‘democratic society’, which trumps a number of competing 
considerations, as we have seen.  
 
4. Moving beyond judicial categories 
 
Having surveyed the case law and identified the distinct types of reasoning that distinguish 
Articles 10-11 from Article P1-3, I hope that one can recognize the need for a normative evaluation of 
the Court’s practice and methodology. As argued above, the findings of the Court depend upon the 
adoption of an interpretive approach (the teleological or the consensualist), but that approach remains 
intertwined with normative considerations about rights. To replace the content ascribed to those rights 
                                                          
51 See Letsas, supra note 4, at 721. 
52 Ed Bates, “Analysing the Prisoner Voting Saga and the British Challenge to Strasbourg,” Human Rights Law 
Review 14, no. 3 (2014), at 509. 
53 Edward Lang, ‘A Disproportionate Response: Scoppola v. Italy (No. 5) and Criminal Disenfranchisement in 
the European Court of Human Rights,’ American University International Law Review 28, no. 3 (2013), at 870. 
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within those interpretive categories is therefore a necessary step of the analysis, but not a sufficient 
one. This exercise merely reveals a dis-analogy between Article 10 and Article P1-3 lodged in the 
proportionality test. In this final section of the paper, I aim to show that this dis-analogy 
conventionally described in terms of judicial methodology embodies a deeper issue of coherence that 
normative democratic theory can identify and problematize.  
 
There are two caveats here. First, the argument I am about to present does not problematize the 
Court’s practice simply based on the complementarity between freedom of expression (informal stage 
of the democratic process) and the right to vote (formal stage) at the level of abstract normative theory. 
Rather, I start from the Court’s own and rich conception of ‘democratic society’ under Articles 10-11 
to avoid the charge of the ‘philosopher king argument’ imposing an independent theory of rights or 
human rights54, an independent theory of human rights adjudication55, or an independent theory of 
judicial review applied to the ECHR.56  This risk also concerns experts of P1-3. As exposed earlier, 
Ziegler does appeal to normative reasoning and ultimately to the independent notions of ‘dignity’, 
‘autonomy’ and ultimately to ‘political equality’.57 Further, he posits the ‘facilitative role’ of voting 
towards ‘an effective political democracy’: ‘rigorous scrutiny of the franchise is essential in order to 
ensure that national policies represent the opinion of the people and are reached democratically’.58 I 
suggest strengthening this link between voting and democracy by rather relying on the Court’s own 
conception of political equality across its case law on Articles 10-11. I hence take the Court’s 
reasoning at face value and place my coherence concerns within these limits. Second, I shall 
problematize the dis-analogy in the case of the prisoners’ right to vote specifically, although this is 
only one issue among many under P1-3. I concentrate on this issue because it crystallizes the Court’s 
restraint and has raised fierce criticism from state parties.  
 
In the remainder of the article, I thus reconstruct the Court’s reasoning from the standpoint of 
democratic theory. On the one hand, I suggest viewing the Court’s sacro-sanct ‘democratic society’ 
(under Articles 10-11) as increasing equal political inclusion, and hence as realizing our moral right to 
an equal political status in the democratic process. If we are subject to democratic outcomes to the 
same extent, our voices and interests should matter equally in both the formal and informal stages of 
the democratic process. On the other hand, relying on the principle of equal subjection has 
implications for the prisoners’ right to vote. Most importantly, this is because democratic decisions 
affect prisoners and citizens equally when the former are released. Their disenfranchisement may 
therefore amount to violating their equal political status from a democratic standpoint. In addition, 
recent research establishes that none of the consequentialist arguments (e.g. that disenfranchisement 
leads to ‘healthier’ democratic outcomes) is solid enough to be seriously considered. Therefore, there 
are strong democratic reasons for the enfranchisement of prisoners. However, I do not conclude that 
there could not be disenfranchisement at all – this would again amount to imposing an independent 
theory. Rather, my point is confined to judicial methodology: since there are strong democratic 
reasons in favour of enfranchisement – reasons that the Court uses to justify and extend Articles 10-11 
– the Court should also engage in balancing (interferences with) P1-3 against its ‘democratic society’ 
in the proportionality test.  
                                                          
54 See for example James Griffin, On Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
55 See in particular George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
56 See for example Richard Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions: 
Political Constitutionalism and the European Convention on Human Rights,’ European Journal of International 
Law 25, no. 4 (2014): 1019–42. 
57 See Ziegler, supra note 6, at 184. 




4.1. The Court’s ‘democratic society’ and democratic theory 
 
Let me start with the Court’s sacro-sanct ‘democratic society’ under Articles 10-11. Why 
should the Court allow someone to express ‘unpalatable’, ‘shocking’, ‘disturbing’ ‘divisive’ views in 
public? Some democratic theorists suggest that this permits a more egalitarian form of public 
deliberation. Two premises matter here. First, the outcome of the democratic process may be very 
costly for those who eventually disagree with it. Allowing dissident views to be expressed prior to 
voting – in the deliberative stage, through Articles 10-11 – reduces this cost and allows them to see 
that they are publicly treated as equals. In the words of Christiano, ‘if people judge the justice of an 
arrangement where a minority or even majority assumes for itself the right to rule for others, they will 
judge that it advances the interests of the ruling class at the expense of the others’.59 This benefit 
serves the interest of the speakers in the deliberation. Second, allowing controversial and divisive 
views creates a public forum for individuals to confront their point of view and learn from those of 
others: ‘the process of discussion and deliberation ought to be thought as instrumental in acquiring 
understanding about one’s interests and one’s society’.60 At the same time, ‘the person can identify 
with the larger projects of the society as a whole as well as the particular projects of parts of society’.61  
Therefore, listening to other viewpoints helps one make an informed decision about what is truly in 
the common interest in one’s view. This second benefit serves the interest of the listeners in the 
deliberation. The combined benefit justifies the Court’s core component of its ‘democratic society’ 
rooted in an informed, pluralistic and controversial public debate. This argument can explain other 
features of the Court’s reasoning – for instance, that the wide content and scope applies only to views 
and opinions that concern issues of ‘public interest’, as the Court clearly insists: ‘there is little scope 
under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on freedom of expression in the area of political speech or debate 
– where freedom of expression is of the utmost importance – or in matters of public interest’. 62 
Similarly, it can explain why the range of social actors whose role is particularly instrumental in 
helping individuals form those views and opinions, such as the press, political parties, scientists and 
intellectuals, or NGOs, as we have seen in the first part of the article.  
 
Political inclusion and the equal considerations of views and interests are crucial to democracy 
because of the underlying principle of equal share to rule. This principle concerns the horizontal 
equality of democratic subjects and echoes Bentham’s famous formulation that ‘each to count for one, 
and none for more than one’.63 But the conceptual framework would be incomplete without a third 
bedrock principle, the one of equal subjection, which concerns the vertical equality between a coercive 
norm and its subjects. The coercive effect of the norm sets the boundaries of the democratic 
community by coercing subjects equally. The variants of the principle span from Goodin’s all affected 
principle (according to which anyone who is ‘possibly affected’64 by a political decision is entitled to 
vote on it) to López-Guerra’s strictly democratic-legal version according to which ‘anyone who is 
subject to the laws of a democratic polity should be included in the citizen body’.65 As the norms 
under the Court’s scrutiny are exclusively those of democratic states and must be prescribed by law (as 
                                                          
59 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), at 90. 
60 Ibid., at 41–42. 
61 Ibid., at 90. 
62 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, App. No. 2034/07, 15 March 2011, at para. 50. 
63 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: W. Pickering, 1823), 
at Corollary 1 of Chapter 17. 
64 Robert Goodin, ‘Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, 
no. 1 (2007), at 53–55. 
65 Claudio López-Guerra, ‘Should Expatriates Vote?,’ Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005), at 221. 
 
16 
required by the proportionality test under the ECHR), I shall adopt the second variant for the 
remainder of my argument. Together with i) equal shared rule and ii) equal political inclusion, iii) 
equal subjection completes a basic framework to assess the Court’s practice. The logical order 
however places equal subjection first, which then justifies the horizontal equality of the deliberation 
process (Articles 10-11) and culminates in the equal right to vote and stand for elections (Article P1-3). 
 
Equipped with this framework, I argue that one can better grasp the problematic nature of the Court’s 
judicial restraint on the issue of the prisoners’ right to vote. More precisely, it helps question the 
consensualist approach to the principle of civic disenfranchisement considered by the Court as a 
legitimate aim in the proportionality test. The conceptual dependence between equal subjection and 
equal inclusion suggests that banning prisoners from voting violates those individuals’ equal political 
status. This is because, although incarcerated, criminal offenders remain subjects to democratic 
decisions. It is unclear why criminal offenders should be excluded from the democratic community 
when collective decisions taken during their incarceration will equally affect them when their sentence 
is terminated. As López-Guerra puts it, ‘they continue to be subject to the laws, and their basic 
interests continue to depend on the decisions of elected officials’.66 This means that despite their 
particular condition, prisoners should keep their franchise capacity on grounds of democratic inclusion.  
 
Now, one could counter-argue that what justifies the disenfranchisement of criminal offenders can be 
supported by another type of democratic argument – namely, that offenders have broken the terms of 
the social contract by committing criminal offenses, and should therefore be punished by 
disenfranchisement. There are two significant problems with this argument. First, it places 
unreasonable demands on individuals. As López-Guerra explains, ‘knowingly or not, most adults have 
broken some law at some point’.67 Such an argument should therefore provide a gravity threshold that 
would outweigh the democratic reasons for enfranchisement. Second, it is unclear why the function of 
punishment should apply to the right to vote specifically. If the ground for disenfranchisement is 
exclusion from the polity, it remains unclear why the polity should still satisfy the felons’ other basic 
needs: ‘to be sure, if they were no longer part of the polity, in addition to disenfranchising them, we 
could cease to provide for their basic needs’.68 To suspend the convicted felons’ equal status in society 
by imprisoning them is one thing, which needs to be justified by normative theories of the criminal 
law (retribution, deterrence, etc.). To deny their equal political status is another thing and needs to be 
balanced with reasons that support their enfranchisement. 
 
Those counter-arguments come from within a democratic and/or social contract framework. Counter-
arguments that are independent from democratic considerations come in different forms, but all centre 
on the idea that disenfranchisement generates desirable consequences. For instance, it is argued that 
allowing offenders to vote promotes the interests of criminals, so that there is an overall loss in the 
value of law enforcement. Alternatively, it is contended that disenfranchisement permits rehabilitation 
or deterrence as beneficial effects sufficient to support the policy. The problem with this kind of 
argument, however, is that it fully depends on empirical evidence, which remains largely unavailable. 
López-Guerra argues that ‘not a single study shows higher crime rates and recidivism in polities where 
felons are allowed to vote, all else being equal’.69 In other words, there are strong democratic reasons 
to keep convicted felons in the franchise, while principled but non-democratic reasons remain rather 
weak.  
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4.2. Returning to the Court’s reasoning 
 
Let us now see how these various arguments for and against disenfranchisement play out in the 
Court’s reasoning under P1-3. More precisely, when the Court considers whether the 
disenfranchisement constitutes a legitimate aim, what does it base its reasoning on? In Hirst, the Court 
does not disapprove of the consequentialist type of argument outlined earlier, namely that the aim of 
disenfranchisement is:  
 
‘preventing crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners and also of 
enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law (…). However, whatever 
doubt there may be as to the efficacy of achieving these aims through a bar on voting, the 
Court finds no reason in the circumstances of this application to exclude these aims as 
untenable or incompatible per se with the right guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 
1’.70  
 
Similarly, in Labita v. Italy, the Court more specifically endorses the view that allowing offenders to 
vote promotes the interests of criminals – in this case, the interests of the Italian mafia. The rationale 
here is that allowing suspected mafia members to vote poses a threat to the Italian institutions. The 
Court held the following: 
 
‘The Court observes that persons who are subject to special police supervision are 
automatically struck off the electoral register as they forfeit their civil rights because they 
represent “a danger to society” or, as in the instant case, are suspected of belonging to the 
Mafia (see paragraphs 107 and 110 above). The Government pointed to the risk that 
persons ‘suspected of belonging to the Mafia’ might exercise their right of vote in favour 
of other members of the Mafia. The Court has no doubt that temporarily suspending the 
voting rights of persons against whom there is evidence of Mafia membership pursues a 
legitimate aim” (my emphasis).71 
 
Still, the Court went to find a violation of P1-3 on the ground that Italian law was disproportionate. 
Indeed, disenfranchisement was imposed after the acquittal of the applicant in domestic courts. This 
illustrates that the Court reviews the proportionality analysis in necessity terms only. As Lang 
concludes, ‘this appears to impose a requirement that, to be proportionate, the punishment must bear a 
relevant and sufficient link to the legitimate aim’.72 But the prior step of the legitimate aim is not 
addressed by the Court and that is where the problematic dis-analogy lies in my view.   
 
4.3. Articulating and limiting the argument 
 
I now have the two main pieces of my puzzle and can suggest how to articulate them 
coherently. On the one hand, I have reconstructed the Court’s ‘democratic society’ under Articles 10-
11 with help of normative democratic theory. I have argued that the Court’s balancing of alleged 
interferences with its ‘democratic society’ reveals the Court’s deep concern for political inclusion and 
representation – it is, to put it shortly, democracy-enhancing. On the other hand, I have showed that 
the Court refrains from engaging in balancing under P1-3 by granting that civic disenfranchisement 
pursues a legitimate aim. I argue that the Court needs to re-arrange the two pieces of the puzzle by 
balancing the legitimate aim of the state party against the Court’s conception of ‘democratic society’. 
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This is because the Court’s ‘democratic society’, when theoretically articulated, has enough normative 
resources to question the very principle of disenfranchisement.  
 
It is crucial to identify the limits of my argument. I am not claiming that there cannot ever be any 
ground for criminal disenfranchisement. Rather, I argue on the one hand that disenfranchisement 
cannot hold if one seriously takes into account the Court’s ‘democratic society’. On the other hand, the 
kind of argument put forward by the Court’s endorsement inherently and strictly depends upon 
empirical evidence, which is brought neither by the state party nor by the Court. But one could 
imagine that the Court does, in which case the Court would have to balance those arguments against 
democratic ones. In other words, my argument is limited to the claim that, given the Court’s emphasis 
on political inclusion under Article 10-11, it ought to engage in a deliberation on the democratic merits 
of civic disenfranchisement and balance those merits against other kinds of arguments. The conclusion 
here is that the Court should not limit the proportionality test to necessity considerations under P1-3 
but instead engage in a substantive weighing of criminal disenfranchisement against its sacro-sanct 




The ambition of this article was to demonstrate that the Court’s methodology under Articles 
10-11 and P1-3 have a more problematic relation than what has been conventionally suggested. The 
prima facie complementarity between freedom of expression and the right to vote alleged by the Court 
was only the starting point of my analysis. A core motivation for the argument sits on the Court’s 
established case law and the predominant types of reasoning underlying Articles 10-11 and P1-3. 
While consonant in principle, the distinct methodology used to determine their content and scope 
indicates a troubling dissonance. The first step of the article consisted in reconstructing both the 
obligations and corresponding type of reasoning on Articles 10-11 and P1-3, respectively, in order to 
immerse ourselves in the Court’s reasoning. My concern in this respect is located in how the Court 
applies the proportionality test. While ‘democratic society’ operates as a threshold against which 
interferences under Articles 10-11 have to be balanced, the Court refrains from balancing under P1-3. 
It rather applies a consensualist approach when addressing the principle of civic disenfranchisement.  
The second step of the argument was that only a reconstruction of the Court’s ‘democratic society’ by 
normative democratic theory reveals that the notion has normative implications for the Court’s 
assessment of the right to vote. I have argued that the Court’s emphasis on the need for an informed, 
plural and contradictory debate amounts to enhancing equal representation and inclusion in the 
democratic process. I then argued that the principle of equal inclusion depends on a principle of equal 
subjection, which in the Court’s context is understood as reaching all those subjected to the democratic 
norms of the state party. I showed how this conceptual dependence between equal inclusion and 
subjection at the normative level provides for the bridging link between Articles 10-11 and P1-3 at the 
judicial level. I illustrated this bridge by the case of the ban of prisoners’ right to vote: the ban does 
not generate any proven desirable effect for society while it violates the prisoners’ equal political 
status. 
The third and final step suggests a reform of the Court’s methodology under P1-3. My argument does 
not imply that there cannot ever be any ground for civic disenfranchisement, and hence that the Court 
should never consider it in the balancing exercise. In fact, the proportionality test is precisely meant to 
consider exceptional circumstances. But the Court’s application of the test, as it stands, is internally 
incomplete and incoherent. Given its insistence on political inclusion across its case law, it cannot 
leave the very principle of civil disenfranchisement outside of its reviewing horizon and simply 
examine proportionality in necessity terms.  
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